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Abstract: This article explores the experiences of community-level actors in the pursuit of greater human
security in their communities. Utilizing a conceptual framework based on the capability approach, human
security, and securitization theory it considers local actor perceptions of security and the strategies used
to achieve their goals. It presents and discusses strategies employed by two distinct actors—a local
non-governmental organization and an independent group of community dwellers—in their attempts to
achieve security functionings. The results of this qualitative study suggest that while community-level actors
view themselves as being empowered as agents in achieving certain human security functionings, the
ability of local actors to achieve higher-level functionings is dependent on their recognition as legitimate
securitizing agents by more powerful actors and potential partner groups.
Keywords: capabilities approach; Copenhagen school; development; human security; securitization
1. Introduction
One of the inherent realities in the human security
paradigm—the idea that security’s chief focus is the vulner-
abilities of individuals—is that those most acutely aware
of insecurities are often the furthest removed from the re-
sources needed to address them. In the face of scarcity,
local actors may seek external resources. However, finding
support or capital from an external source has its own set of
challenges. Resources earmarked for local-scale projects
are limited, and funding may come laden with obligations
tied to other interests. Furthermore, international or state
actors can influence how security and development agen-
das are implemented in favour of their own interests. As
a result, much of the discourse, policy, and practices can
become disconnected from the people in need. As Liotta
and Owen describe it, “idealism thus becomes enmeshed
in realism; actions taken on behalf of the powerless are
determined only by the powerful” [1]. Security policies
and projects can be developed in a manner that relegates
locally derived human security values to secondary con-
siderations in favour of the interests of other actors. As
a consequence, the pursuit of security can be perceived
as operating in a top-down manner and communities be-
come passive receivers and objects of policy, not as agents
capable of consolidating local security discourse and influ-
encing policy. Given this context, it is not always possible
for local actors to achieve the security goals which they
value most; however, it is incorrect to characterize local
actors as passive, and an injustice to deny the agency
they have as security actors. Local people are often the
most important agents for security, deeply involved with
improving the conditions of their communities. For empow-
ered local actors, the lack of resources can be just another
c© 2017 by the authors; licensee Librello, Switzerland. This open access article was published
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barrier to overcome, not something that builds dependence
and erodes agency. But, in these situations, what differen-
tiates those actors who successfully pursue security goals
in their communities? What strategies can they apply to
achieve their security needs?
This article presents and reflects on the perspectives
of community-level actors regarding their role in improv-
ing security conditions in their communities. Using a
conceptual framework based on the capability approach,
human security, and securitization, it explores the ques-
tion of how local actors engage in security-making, apply
strategies, and leverage agency to achieve their human
security goals. More specifically, it presents and dis-
cusses strategies employed by two distinct actors—a
local non-governmental organization and an indepen-
dent group of community dwellers—to construct and
achieve valued security functionings. This qualitative
study demonstrates that community-level actors view
themselves as agents in achieving human security func-
tionings, despite recognizing their own limitations in
achieving higher-level functionings independently. Addi-
tionally, it shows that expanding human security capabili-
ties can depend on recognition as legitimate securitizing
agents by other actors and partner groups. The first
two sections of this paper present the methodological
and theoretical components of the study. Later sections
provide empirical evidence of these strategies and pro-
cesses from local community-level actors in the research
area, and discuss the implications for securitization the-
ory in regards to human security—specifically, whether
a bottom-up form of securitization can be applied to an-
alyze local actor security dynamics. In doing so, this
paper argues that more attention is needed to analyzing
security dynamics at the grassroots level, in particular,
the role of local actors in sculpting security values.
2. Methods
The study was developed and carried out between Septem-
ber 2012 and December of 2013. It employed a qualitative
case study approach, organized into desk, field, and syn-
thesis phases. Qualitative case study design was selected
to provide a fuller exploration of the complexity inherent in
human security as well as a high level of detail on informant
perspectives regarding security strategies [2]. The desk
phase began with the selection of a research area and the
examination of articles and published reports on develop-
ment and potential human security issues in that area. Both
broad and narrow definitions of human security were con-
sidered. The aim was to familiarize the researcher with con-
temporary security and development issues in post-conflict
Liberia, including a knowledge base regarding influential
actors and organizations in the research area. Additionally,
it aided in developing interview guides and establishing a
baseline for comparing interview data. Liberia was selected
as a research area based on three factors: firstly, the strong
likelihood of diverse individual perspectives on sources of in-
security given the post-conflict and less-developed country
status of the setting [3]; secondly, the presence of signifi-
cant international organizations focusing on development
and security issues; and thirdly, the widespread use of
English that enables the researcher and informants to com-
municate clearly and effectively, minimizing the chances for
misinterpretation. Additionally, the historic role of the state
as a source of insecurity coupled with the contemporary
weakness of the state suggested that Liberia would likely
have situations in which local and community actors as-
sumed the role as primary security actors [4–6]. Moreover,
state misgovernance has been identified elsewhere as be-
ing a source of insecurity itself [7]. Social media tools were
employed by the researcher to build contacts and garner
further information on potential research communities. A
specific case study area was identified, near the city of Pay-
nesville, selected for the observed presence of thematically
relevant organizations and groups.
In September and October of 2013, the field phase of
this study used participant observation, group discussions,
and one-on-one interviews as the primary sources of data
collection. The interview process consisted of unstructured
and semi-structured components. Twenty-three informants
were recruited through both purposeful and snowball sam-
pling (See: Table 1). Initial informant contact was through
social media, then additional informants were recruited
via local networks. This method of convenience sampling
helped to effectively understand the relationships between
actors on the ground, highlighting the types of networks
and social capital available to informants [8]. Nineteen
informants were recruited in this manner, including gov-
ernment workers, volunteers, and other relevant security
actors. Three targeted interviews were conducted with
non-Liberian staff working in fields relevant to human secu-
rity. A final interview with the leader of Youth Crime Watch
of Liberia (YCWL) confirmed details of the organizations
history, objectives, and strategies. All interviews except
one were recorded, transcribed, and anonymized. The
remaining informant, employed in the police services, de-
clined to be recorded, so the researcher took handwritten
notes. One-on-one interviews utilized an interview guide
developed during the desk phase, but iteratively modified
during the observation period. Group interviews, inter-
organizational meetings, and relevant written sources such
as internal documents and annual reports provided the
researcher with additional details regarding the strategies
applied by the actors in the two cases discussed in this
study (See: Table 2).
The synthesis phase consisted of data coding using a
thematic framework to analyze and process the informants’
responses. Unstructured portions of interviews were coded
into emergent thematic categories generated through multi-
ple readings by the researcher. Semi-structured portions
of the interviews were coded using a framework developed
on the basis of specific question responses as well as the
general research questions. The themes used for analyz-
ing the research were centered on informant definitions of
security/insecurities, perceptions of security responsibility,
perceptions of inter-actor relations, and others.
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Table 1. Informant’s self-identified background and relation to case studies.
Interview number & Pseudonym Occupation / Role Liberian Citizen Informant Network
1 - Mike Lecturer (political science) x YCWL
2 - Tim Student (geology) x YCWL
3 - Jack Volunteer. Labourer x YCWL
4 - Victor NGO (healthcare)
5 - Eric Student. Tutorer x Eric’s Group
6 - James Volunteer x YCWL
7 - Omar Unemployed x YCWL
8 - Gerry NGO (refugees)
9 - Nancy NGO (armed violence). Music promoter
10 - Ivan Student (geology) x YCWL
11 - Max Volunteer. Basketball Coach x YCWL
12 - Jake NGO (peacebuilding) x
13 - Fred Graduate (business). Merchant x
14 - Steve Graduate (business). Merchant x
15 - Arnold NGO (development). Police x YCWL
16 - Luke NGO (crime & violence). Training x YCWL
17 - Mark Media Practitioner. Previous NGO work x YCWL
18 - Joe Security professional. Former police x
20 - Zack NGO (Crime) x YCWL
21 – Zuo Taylor YCWL Leader x
22 – Otto 1 Unknown x Eric’s Group
23 – John 1 Government (refugee related) x Eric’s Group
a Denotes informants who participated in group interviews only
Table 2. Data collection table.
Data Collection Type N Other information
One-on-one interviews n = 21 Some individuals also took part in group interviews
Group interviews n = 4 Occurred opportunistically
Youth Crime Watch Liberia meetings n = 10
Inter-organizational meeting observations n = 4
UNICEF (1), UNDP (1), Early Warning Early
Response Working Group (1), Ushahidi Liberia (1)
3. Conceptual Framework
In approaching this research a conceptual framework was
developed to encapsulate issues of security values, agency,
and actor relations. It incorporates three key ideas into its
analytical perspective: human security gives us a flexible
and inclusive notion of threats and insecurities; the capabil-
ity approach provides an understanding of values, agency,
and a normative reference point; and, securitization gives
us an analytical starting point for understanding how local
actors construct and pursue valued security issues.
3.1. Securitization and Security-Making
Exploring the role of local actors in the pursuit of security
requires understanding how security happens at the local
level. Security is not a fixed concept and is influenced by
a complex array of structures and variables. Moreover,
security is fragmented in terms of subject, object, and
practice [9]. Borrowing from the Copenhagen School’s
notion of securitization, this research adopts a social con-
structivist approach to security in order to understand how
actors imbue security with their own values and meanings.
Applying this concept to analyze security dynamics at a
local level enables a better understanding of the potential
roles of local actors.
Securitization describes the process in which security
threats are socially constructed through speech acts. The
units involved in this process are securitizing agents, ref-
erent objects, and functional actors [10]. The securitizing
agent is an actor who makes a claim that a particular issue—
the referent object—is a threat or is threatened. If the claim
is deemed credible by the functional actors or audience,
then that object falls into the realm of security threat to be
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acted upon through some kind of special handling [10]. This
process of actor claims and audience acceptance gener-
ates notions of security and threats. For the purposes of
this article, “actor” will refer to the agent making a claim
regarding security and “audience” will refer to those that
must evaluate the legitimacy of said claim.
Framing this process as interplay between claim-making
actors and claim-interpreting audiences fundamentally al-
ters the arena in which security notions are determined.
Williams describes how “not only is the realm of possible
threats enlarged, but the actors or objects that are threat-
ened. . . can be extended to include actors and objects well
beyond the military security of the territorial state” [11]. How-
ever, despite this widening of potential actors, not every
securitizing claimant will be successful in shaping security.
Thierry Balzacq suggests three considerations that influ-
ence effective securitization: 1) how it is context-dependent;
2) how it is audience-centered; and 3) the dynamics of
power [12]. This is reinforced by Williams, who notes that,
not all actors are empowered to make effective claims:
While the securitization process is in principle com-
pletely open (any “securitizing actor” can attempt to securi-
tize any issue and referent object), in practice it is structured
by the differential capacity of actors to make socially effec-
tive claims about threats, by the forms in which these claims
can be made in order to be recognized and accepted as
convincing by the relevant audience [11].
Securitizing actors require social or political legitimacy
to have their claims accepted. Furthermore, claims need
to have a degree of resonance with the values of their au-
dience [12]. Securitizing acts that lack social, cultural, or
political relevance to the audience are unlikely to align with
that audience’s needs and expectations.
Audience receptivity and the legitimacy of the response
is a key aspect of securitization. Not only are socially de-
rived norms, experiences, and values relevant to what is
viewed as a potential insecurity, they also influence the le-
gitimacy of claims on what actions can be reasonably taken
in response [9]. The securitizing agent may be recognized
as a legitimate speaker of security, but agreement on re-
sponses towards the referent are still contingent on what is
acceptable to the audience. For example, mass shootings
in schools might be a very legitimate source of insecurity,
but it is doubtful that issuing weapons to students would
be regarded as a legitimate response. The audience must
deem a security claim in terms of both the threat and the
proposed response.
While securitization is largely about convincing an au-
dience to break free of normal politics, the process is also
intersubjective, having elements of social negotiation [10].
In the context of local actors, this means security claims
should focus on issues and insecurities that are relevant
at the local level but retain resonance amongst potential
audiences. Since insecurities at this level are often highly
localized, they may not be intuitively relevant to non-local
audiences. A number of factors, including social and po-
litical capital, perceived legitimacy as speakers of security,
and their claims about referent objects, potentially limit the
agency of securitizing actors.
3.2. Human Security
Understanding the role of local actors in the pursuit of se-
curity necessitates adopting a concept of security that is
relevant for them. The reality for many people is that tradi-
tional notions of state-based security have limited bearing
on their daily lives. Moreover, through issues like misgov-
ernance, the state has been recognized as a source of
insecurity itself [7]. State-oriented traditions of security offer
little to address issues like undernourishment or the perse-
cution of sexual minorities. Security at the local level often
has more to do with underdevelopment and human rights
than military or state power.
The association between security and underdevelop-
ment was largely popularized by the 1994 United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Re-
port [13]. The report mainstreamed human security, shifting
the focus of security discourse from a state-centric notion
to one that recognized the security needs of individuals
and communities. As Emma Rothschild notes, one of the
results of this shift was the connection drawn between the
security of individuals, states, and the international systems
as a whole [14]. The post-cold war reality meant that if
the world was to be secured, then the security of individu-
als needed to be addressed alongside interstate conflicts.
Without buttressing the security of people, the conditions
for peace would be untenable. This bound the individual
and the global, creating a space for audience susceptibility
to security claims made by local actors.
Unfortunately, it is a conceptual and logistical chal-
lenge to address the diverse security needs of individuals
and groups. Human security acknowledges insecurities
as being highly contextualized. Not only is it difficult to
identify specific threats to individual wellbeing, but it is
difficult to codify them in a way that is conducive to policy
development and analysis. The UNDP suggested seven
categories of security threats as potentially destabilizing:
economic, food, health, environmental, personal, com-
munity, and political security [13]. However, this range of
concepts was somewhat unwieldly, which is perhaps why
the Commission on Human Security (CHS) reformulates
human security as follows:
Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more
than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human
rights, good governance, access to education and health
care, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities
and choices to fulfil his or her own potential. . . Freedom
from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of the future
generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these
are the interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore
national security [15].
Security expands beyond survival and recognizes the
need to live a life that individuals have cause to value.
This reformulation creates a more manageable concep-
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tual paradigm, but it offers little to help delineate units of
analysis or understand how individuals determine priorities
and appraise security needs. Freedom from fear and want
may capture the fundamental imagery, but does little to
provide a blueprint for policy, practice, and analysis. The
non-specificity of the core requirements of human secu-
rity is at the heart of much of the critique of the concept
[16–18]. However, in a study of numerous National Human
Development Reports (NHDR), Richard Jolly and Deepayan
Basu Ray [19] demonstrate that when human security ana-
lyzes have been executed, these criticisms fail to manifest
as impediments to operationalizing a conceptually open,
people-centered, and context-dependent framework. Jolly
and Basu Ray’s analysis suggests that developing a con-
crete list of human security components or factors is not
necessary from an operational point of view—human se-
curity needs can effectively be identified “in theater”, so to
speak. However, while their analysis demonstrates the value
of flexible definitions, it does little to explain how security
values and needs are constructed at the individual level. To
bridge this gap this study employed the capability approach.
3.3. Capability Approach
The capability approach is a normative evaluative frame-
work focused on the ability of individuals to achieve the
things they value through expanding real freedoms and
opportunities. The fundamental units of this approach are
functionings and capabilities [20]. Functionings are those
things that an individual has cause to value doing or being.
Capabilities are freedoms and capacities that enable one
to achieve various functionings. The classic example is that
of a starving child as compared to a fasting monk. Eating,
fasting, and starving are all potential functionings, however,
fasting is fundamentally different from starving because for
the monk it is a choice. The monk exists in a situation of
greater security, retaining the ability to eat if exposed to a
deterioration in livelihood.
Generally, the capability approach is not conventionally
folded into discussions of human security except for when
one is clarifying the distinction between human develop-
ment and human security [19,21]. However, this paper
argues that the ability of individuals and communities to
achieve human security goals—herein referred to as secu-
rity functionings—is a capability worth measuring in itself.
Individuals are fundamental agents in the pursuit of security
functionings. Not considering agency and choices in rela-
tion to security alienates individuals from the values that
matter most to them.
The connection between values, agency, and security-
making is at the heart of this research and is articulated
by the CHS, in that “human security must also aim at de-
veloping the capabilities of individuals and communities to
make informed choices and to act on behalf of causes and
interests in many spheres of life” [15]. This means creating
the conditions for the expansion of capabilities of people
to pursue security functionings. Efforts to support human
security must be evaluated by whether or not they expand
opportunities and remove barriers to the pursuit of human
security functionings.
The question is how to identify the functionings that
are valued by local level actors? Several authors have at-
tempted to codify universal capabilities lists or sets to apply
as a supplement to Sen’s framework [22–27]. However,
Sen has himself remained skeptical of these attempts:
The problem is not with listing important capabilities,
but with insisting on one predetermined canonical list of
capabilities, chosen by theorists without any general so-
cial discussion or public reasoning. To have such a fixed
list. . . is to deny the possibility of fruitful public participation
on what should be included and why. . . public discussion
and reasoning can lead to a better understanding of the role,
reach and significance of particular capabilities. . . [28].
Externally creating lists of capabilities precludes partici-
pation and thereby undermines local values. To understand
how local values manifest, it is essential to look for security
needs expressed and pursued by local actors themselves.
Making a security claim can be interpreted as an expres-
sion of value— a declaration that a particular functioning is
needed to assure a security goal. The referent object repre-
sents a valued security functioning, or some combination of
doings or beings that if not achieved will result in insecurity.
Not all security functionings will be the subject of a se-
curity claim. Social and political contexts influence which
values are likely to be presented, and claims might not
represent the most critical security needs. Social struc-
tures and power disparity will inevitably influence the values
that are expressed within social groups [29]. Denuelin and
McGregor [30] have argued that the capability approach
needs to be strengthened through a recognition of how so-
cial factors influence the development values. Our social
nature influences which referent objects become subject
to security claim. When considering human security con-
cerns we must be cognizant of how social factors impact
value-forming and security-making processes in three ways:
firstly, social dynamics influence which functionings are val-
ued; secondly, power dynamics influence which values are
expressed as a security claim; and thirdly, these influences
are potentially omnidirectional, including those coming from
non-local actors. The research investigates the existence of
local capabilities by exploring the dynamics of how valued
security functionings manifest and the strategies employed
by local actors to achieve them. It utilizes the idea of securi-
tization to analyze the ways in which local actors construct
and position their security needs. Furthermore, it considers
the differential capacity of actors to make effective claims
about security.
4. Results—Evidence from Liberia
The results of this study will be presented in two parts. First,
we present data relating to understandings of insecurities
in communities and perspectives on actor agency in the
pursuit of improved human security. This provides us with
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insight into how local individuals identify valued security
functionings and reflect upon their own agency in achieving
them. Second, we present two sample cases in which local
actors adopted strategies to achieve their security goals.
This section digs deeper into the specific strategies through
which local actors attempt to achieve their valued security
functionings. These parallel but differently successful strate-
gies show that not all local actors have the same range of
capabilities in terms of achieving their security goals.
4.1. Community Understandings of Security
As this research sought to understand local actors as secu-
rity agents, a key consideration is how informants views their
notion of a secure life, their capacity to identify insecurities
in their communities, and their ideas about the responsibility
and power to pursue security goals. The aim of this line of
investigation is to uncover the existence of locally valued
security functionings and the informants’ perceived level of
agency in achieving those goals.
In regards to the informants’ ideas on important security
functionings, views were broad but largely consistent with
the idea of human security. Some respondents had a fairly
simple conception of security. For Jack, “. . . security means
protection. Security means to have a bed peace, that when
you are sleeping, when you have security in your environ-
ment. When you have security, you can sleep well” [3]. The
connection between safety and security was echoed by
Max, who additionally described employment as key to both
his own security, and also in reducing crime in his commu-
nity [13]. Others linked security to more complex, emotional
or social needs. A geology student, Tim, linked security
to his ability “. . . to feel proud and I feel that with security I
can contribute immensely to the good and development of
my country” [2]. Interestingly, two informants responded by
addressing the complexity of security as a concept. Mark
asked, “When you say secure, what do you mean? Food
security? Safety?” [21] Luke had similar concerns, reflect-
ing that “. . . security is a broad terminology and could refer
to your daily life, it could refer to an entire country” [20].
Informants’ notions of security were generally reflective of
the complexity found in human security discourses.
When asked about specific insecurities they felt needed
to be addressed, responses were varied. The most com-
mon concern was criminal activity, however, Fred, Eric, and
Max saw it as being connected to issues of poor infras-
tructure, unemployment, and a failure to meet basic needs.
[7,13,15] Fred was concerned about the lack of electric-
ity, saying, “. . . where there is no electricity, you see them
burglarizing (. . . ) and go and hijacking people.” Eric was
concerned about infrastructure as a threat to the ability of
students to go to school to study, saying, “. . . everywhere
in Liberia, the road is damaged. No electricity. We are in
darkness”. The lack of basic infrastructure was also tied to
health security by Mark, who expressed concerns regarding
waste management:
I live in a fence, and right outside the fence there is a
garbage dump. There’s my fence, right here, people dump
dirt all in the front of the fence here. It is rising, to the
point where it is rising to the level of my fence. Children
defacate there, okay? And one time there was a dead
baby found there [21].
The fence surrounding Mark’s home was used as a
dumping area in the community for refuse—or “dirt” in the
colloquial Liberian. Sanitation and refuse management as
a health threat was well recognized by informants.
Additionally, food security was mentioned by Max, Jack,
and Steven as being an ongoing concern [3,13,21]. Max
observed that they “. . . have kids that are hungry in the
community and we find that are not good looking, like mal-
nutrition” and it becomes a concern for the entire community.
Steve went further, suggesting that food insecurity often led
to criminal activity. Again, the sources of insecurity identi-
fied by the informants were broad, and often interconnected.
Moreover, the ready ability to identify insecurities in their
communities suggests a sense of value or priority in relation
to needed security functionings.
Informants had mixed responses when asked about how
to address insecurities and who was responsible for improv-
ing security conditions. Informants recognized the need
for multi-level approaches to addressing insecurities, but
responses varied based on the type of insecurity. On the
issue of economic security, informants pointed vaguely to-
wards the government. Eric felt that the government needed
“. . . to put some measure into place” for encouraging job
creation.[7] Similarly, Tim believed that the government
was responsible for getting young people off the streets
[2]. Generally, the economy and jobs were largely seen as
the realm of government actors, however, Zack and Steven
felt that community groups had a role in creating education
opportunities locally [16–18,29]. Group discussions pointed
towards a divided role with the community supporting indi-
viduals to develop entrepreneurial skills, but the need for
government actors to do more to support secure employ-
ment through economic development.
Safety and crime elicited a starkly divided response.
Eric, John, and Omar felt that neighbourhood watch or vigi-
lante groups were a major source of security [7,9,31]. Other
informants believed that the Liberian National Police (LNP)
should be responsible, but that their limited capacity and
reputation for corruption made it difficult. Mike argued that
repairing that reputation would reduce reliance on vigilante
groups [1]. Arnold believed the best solution was for com-
munity watch groups to “ensure that every activity they carry
on, they liaise with the Liberian National Police” [19]. For
him, responsibility was shared between levels and actors.
Otto had a similar view, saying, “. . . the community do have
the responsibility to address the issue of security for the
fact that the community knows best” [32]. In general, infor-
mants felt that the role of the community was undervalued
by non-local actors.
When discussing how cooperative efforts worked in re-
ality, Arnold, Luke, and Max took issue with some NGOs’
approaches [13,19,20]. Citing an example of a well drilled
27
too close to a mass grave for local people’s comfort, Max
said “organizations that work in communities would just
come in and carry on projects. They make a lot of mistakes
and a lot of things goes wrong.” Luke argued that the lack
of democratic input from local people was also a problem,
recalling an NGO project from a community he had visited:
. . . some NGO built a market center there. And the mar-
ket center they built. . . somewhere on the football field of
that town. But I’m sure there weren’t a lot of consultation
with them. Probably maybe the town chiefs just agreed to
give that land and just build it there, they didn’t even consult
with them [20].
Lack of local participation was viewed as an impediment
to ownership. Luke felt that NGO consultation with chiefs
did not guarantee the respecting of local values or local
involvement. Jack and James felt that local chiefs had an
important role in conveying the needs of the community to
higher-level actors.[3,8] Relating to social and symbolic cap-
ital, Jack felt that the chief or elected representative was in
a better position to speak for the community, saying, “. . . as
a local person, we cannot go and say ‘we need this, we
need that’ ” Many informants felt that international and even
some national structures and agencies were out of reach for
locals. Max went so far as to describe international groups
as being “afraid of the air” [13]. These types of comments
were reflective of a perceived barrier between local and
non-local actors. This lack of access to audiences who
could help was a compounding issue for many, especially
in context of poor infrastructure.
If taken at face value, these responses suggest infor-
mants felt they lacked agency in dealing with insecurities,
however, when probed on the topic informants emphasized
the importance of local actors. Otto, a particularly strong
supporter of controversial vigilante groups, attested to this
saying that “security is actually everybody’s problem. It is
not an individual problem. When it is at the door of one indi-
vidual it is good that every other person go to help solve that
problem” [32]. He held that individuals and communities
had to involve themselves more in situations where state
sources of security were absent. Zack argued for a shared
responsibility, stressing cooperation between communities
and government:
We have to work together, see? So it’s not like I have to
blame the government, because it is not the government
that making this place unsafe. It is the people that live in
the community that make this place unsafe. So it require,
you know what I’m saying, a mutual understanding and a
good working relationship between the community and the
police to better the situation [29].
This type of mixed approach was also advocated by
Jack, who described the roots of security within communi-
ties as follows:
. . . I would think that the main source of security would
be the local structure. I don’t want to be specific to say like
peace committees or so on, but the chiefs, the elders, those
traditional leaders. Umm, the youth, all of them coming
together. It is that social cohesion within the community.
That’s what keeps them secure. It is not about the police.
Those infrastructures, it means nothing. Security is about
the people [3].
Mark had a democratic perspective, emphasizing the
importance in local people speaking out for their values:
You have your district representatives, you have your
county senators (. . . ) to address the challenges. You
also have civil society, you have community groups (. . . )
who have to speak out. I’m not saying these people are
implementers, these people are not implementers but
these are people who have to speak out, hold government
accountable, make these things known to their represen-
tatives, make these things know to their senators, gather
together, organize themselves as a community, hold meet-
ings, consult with each other, and say “okay, this is what
we need. We are going to take it to the representative.”
If he doesn’t deliver, we are gonna remove him from the
seat next election [21].
The diversity of responses regarding strategies for
achieving security functionings and working within the social
and political structure highlights a broad understanding of
how local agency can be applied. Informants had clear con-
cerns regarding insecurities, types of preferred responses,
and strategies on how they would address them. What
emerges from this threefold: firstly, local actors have de-
fined values in regards to security; secondly, local actors
have priorities and preferences relating to the solutions to
insecurities; and thirdly, local actors have a strong concept
of their own agency and strategies for achieving their valued
security functionings. We can then say that interviewees
have a strong sense of which security functionings they
value, and at least some notions of how they would prefer
to see them addressed. In the next sections we will explore
the reality of how some local actors attempt to achieve se-
curity functionings. In doing so we will see the challenges
for local actor efforts to move beyond valued functionings
into the realm of real capabilities.
4.2. Case One: A Local NGO—Lobbying and Legitimacy
The first case for discussion in this study is that of a lo-
cally operating NGO called Youth Crime Watch of Liberia
(YCWL). The organization was founded by a group of com-
munity dwellers who recognized that crime and a lack of
youth engagement were a persistent problem in their com-
munity. Young people were regularly exposed to drugs,
alcohol, and were at risk for recruitment into criminal gangs.
The focus has evolved over time, moving beyond crime re-
duction into issues of youth employment, gender-based vio-
lence, amongst others [32]. A senior manager with YCWL
describes the organization as “. . . engaging the minds of
young people for positive outcomes. We believe in aware-
ness raising education as well as. . . programs such as life
skills and job creation” [30]. YCWL has at times used a
branch structure with groups operating across a number
of communities and educational institutions, enabling them
to build networks and leverage the social capital of their
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members. As such, YCWL has employed a strategy of con-
solidating public support and coordinating with other actors
in the pursuit of their goals.
In the first year of operation, YCWL pursued accredita-
tion from the Ministry of Planning and Economics Affairs and
Ministry of Youth and Sports, and also sought membership
with the Federation of Liberian Youth [31]. Recognizing that
connections with local police would be essential towards
their success as an organization, YCWL signed a mem-
orandum of understanding with the LNP. The organization
focused on building a reputation among national-level organi-
zations, leading to opportunities with international organiza-
tions such as the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL),
the UNDP, amongst others [31]. These connections built
credibility amongst national and international actors.
Following accreditation, YCWL expanded to different
educational institutions. During this time YCWL recognized
that gender issues needed to be a priority, in particular,
gender-based violence. YCWL sought support from UN-
MIL to plan a rally against gender based violence as a
way of “buttressing National Government and women or-
ganizations who have continued to struggle for rape pre-
vention, education and public awareness” [31]. The aim
of the program was to give community youth and elders
an opportunity to discuss sexual violence and prevention
strategies. Recognizing the sensitivity of the issue, YCWL
invited Liberian comedian Georgio Boutini to draw in partici-
pants. By partnering with actors across all levels, including
Liberian celebrities, YCWL built a reputation as an orga-
nization that understands the local people and acts as a
bridge with international organizations [30]. This kind of
social capital granted them a great deal of credibility and
legitimacy when speaking on behalf of communities.
Gender issues have continued to be a theme for the
organization. By 2010 YCWL resolved that the best way
to improve security for women was through local empower-
ment and education opportunities for women and girls [33].
YCWL began holding seminars aimed at empowering young
women and raising awareness of gender issues with public
rallies and retreats. Moreover, the organization was able to
procure funding to build their Young Women’s Empowerment
through approaching the Japanese Government Grant for
Grassroots Human Security Projects (GGP) scheme [34].
Their success in these areas has led to them finding oppor-
tunities to influence other security endeavours, such as the
Early Warning Early Response Working Group [35].
At of the end of the field phase of this research, YCWL
had yet to officially open and commence programming at
the Empowerment Center. The GGP grant contained the re-
striction that it could only be used to finance the construction
and outfitting of the center with basic equipment [36]. More-
over, the group lacked female leadership to lend credibility
to their role as an organization for empowering women, and
the current leadership expressed concerns regarding their
ability to secure funding for women’s programming [36]. By
the end of the research period, the leadership of the orga-
nization was laying plans for the drilling of a well, recruiting
candidates for a female head of the center, and searching
for fundraising opportunities. The group has since secured
further funding from the Norwegian Agency for Development
Cooperation (NORAD) to continue their efforts.
YCWL has been effective at communicating, pursuing,
and achieving security functionings that they value. Their
ability to build networks with other local, national, and inter-
national level actors has enabled them to act as a bridge
between community dwellers and other actors. Having roots
in both the local community and connections to international
agencies has put pressure on the small group to be account-
able and transparent. Future challenges for the organiza-
tion include gender inclusiveness in decision making, and
staying transparent and accountable. Furthermore, finding
stable funding for programming at their new center is certain
to come with new donor pressures. YCWL does not yet
have the ability to operate completely independently to pur-
sue all the security functionings that they value. Accessing
resources remains dependent on appeals to external actors.
Despite this, it can be said that the strategies they have
applied to pursue security functionings have been effective,
clearly indicating the existence of security capabilities.
4.3. Case Two: Independent Community Actors
Bottom-Up Securitization?
While YCWL was able to leverage their social resources to
build a reputation and establish themselves as a legitimate
security actor in their community, not all actors have the
capacity to implement the same strategies. Others lack the
networks or social capital required to generate legitimacy.
One of the informants for this project, Eric, has struggled to
overcome these challenges in his attempts to build a school
in his remote community. His story is an example of how
some local actors can act as security agents but still be
frustrated by the self-interest of others.
The conflict in Liberia separated Eric from his family and
he ended up as a refugee in Ghana.[7] While there, he man-
aged to get an education and find work teaching in refugee
camps alongside volunteer teachers from an international
NGO. During this time Eric developed an appreciation for
the importance of education in creating opportunities for
young people.
After returning to Liberia and reuniting his displaced and
scattered family, Eric endeavoured to help meet the needs
for primary education in his community. His experience
in the refugee camps familiarized him with the problems
caused by a lack of education and schools, and he did not
want the same to occur in his new community:
When I came, what I experienced was seeing was little
kids they just running around. Selling for people, working
for people. No education. My brothers, they weren’t even
in school. It was difficult. Until I came and was able to
gather them (. . . ) I think would be good is to have at least a
primary school. That at least will ease the burden of many
Liberians and also help the government [7].
The lack of educational opportunities was seen as a bur-
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den on the community and the government. Moreover, the
long distance between the community and the local school
created fears that the children would be exposed to dangers
on their commute. Eric, his friends, and his family decided
that they needed to construct an elementary school in their
community. The first step in the process was to rally local
support, and this would become their first roadblock.
Eric and his colleagues explained that mustering support
from their community was not easy. While discussing the
school project in a local cafe, Otto explained that “. . . before
you can venture into a community to carry out the projects,
you need to synthesize mission, you need to synthesize
people. If you just go there and want to begin the project
immediately it might somehow be difficult” [32].
Community projects could not be effectively imple-
mented without the support of the community as a whole.
This was evident when the group met resistance raising
support to build the school. The group decided that maybe
the best way to earn support was to focus on a specific
audience within the community:
What we did, we went to the women and talked to the
women. Because we have this school in one village, about
an hour and a half walk to that school, we told the women
that if you sit here and refuse that this project comes to your
community, you are risking the lives of your children. Your
children have to walk an hour and a half. Anybody can sit on
the road to rape them. Anybody can harm them while they
are going to school and come from school. And they agree
that this was true, so they went back to their husbands, and
told them, actually this community wants to work here [32].
While initially resistant to the idea, the men of the com-
munity recognized the values and concerns of their wives
and were convinced for the need for a local school. For Eric
and Otto, this was a key step and they quickly rallied sup-
port from other community members who agreed to donate
land and to help with the construction of the school [7].
The next barrier was finding a donor. Eric reached
out to his international contacts from his time teaching in
Ghana. One of his former co-workers put Eric in touch with
a group in Israel willing to donate. However, the group had
expressed concerns about the legitimacy of the project and
asked for documentation (building plans, cost estimates,
etc.) and for an inspection of the proposed location [37].
Eric was sympathetic and felt that international groups had
legitimate fears concerns for working smaller groups be-
cause trusting local level actors is not always safe:
. . . to trust somebody is not easy to do. Because there
are a lot of people they offer to, and then they destroy the op-
portunity. Most NGO and most donor, they being, you know,
so tight, because you know, before they give you money they
have to trust you and know who to give the money and they
want to know information. . . how you use the money [7].
While the NGO reluctance to trust local level actors with
funds was frustrating, it was also understandable by the
group. Eric felt that while it restricted local opportunities to
freely pursue goals, it was reasonable because some local
actors’ motives could be dishonest. Eric and Otto prepared
the documents while waiting for an inspector to arrive from
Accra to compile his report on the site.
Once the inspector arrived, Eric’s family hosted him
for several days, explaining the project and showing him
around the community. Afterwards, Eric was told to wait
for a response from the donors based on the report [7].
Unfortunately, it never came. After months of waiting
to hear from donors, Eric phoned them directly. They
explained that they had never received the report. The
inspector had taken his payment and could not be con-
tacted. When Eric asked if they were still willing to help
the project, they declined but said that they would be
willing to support a different project:
. . . he was so sorry to write, you know, but what I should
do is to try to write a project to establish fair trade. He
said, through the fair trade, when the fair trade business is
moving, then we will be able to work in another direction
to order to be able establish as school (. . . ) So I decided
to write the project again about soap making, you know for,
you know how to produce soap like in the community for
people to have for wash their clothes and things [7].
The group drafted a new proposal based on the soap-
making initiative suggested by the donors and approached
his community again. The new suggestion was met with
disappointment. The community had expectations for sup-
port in building a school and the news of that evaporating
broke their trust in Eric:
Before the Ghanaian man came, the entire community
they were so happy. Even to get a piece of land is difficult,
but because they are happy, some of the community mem-
ber promised to give one lot, then the other ones. . . but at
the end result, no all from me [7].
In the end, the cancellation of the school project was a
loss of face for Eric in the eyes of his community. Having
spent his own time and money on the project, including long
taxi rides to the nearest internet cafe´, money spent develop-
ing project proposals, and hosting the Ghanaian inspector,
Eric felt let down by the experience. Exploitation of the
situation by the inspector and the altering of project plans
to suit the donor group severely undermined Eric’s credibil-
ity within his community. Despite this, his group remained
hopeful that they could support the education of children in
his village by offering tutoring at his home and continuing
to seek funds to build a school. This was not the preferred
functioning, but the only one within their capabilities.
5. Discussion
In regards to community understandings of security, it is
clear that most of the informants hold complex notions of
security that included both individual and social aspects.
Informants expressed concerns for security in terms of phys-
ical safety, nutrition, unemployment, education, and more.
Furthermore, informants acknowledged that insecurities
were often interrelated, with issues of criminality and per-
sonal safety being connected to problems in the economic
or social systems. The ability of the informants to readily
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identify and discuss human security threats and solutions in
their communities illustrates the existence of preferences on
human security functionings. In the language of capabilities
approach, these types of responses suggest that informants
have values in regards to the capabilities needed to feel
secure in their lives. These responses suggest that types
of security concerns held by community dwellers are well
reflected by conventional interpretations of human security.
Based on this, it is clear that the human security concept
holds relevance and is applicable to the security values and
needs of local-level actors in the research area. Whether in-
formants felt they had the real freedom or agency to achieve
these human security functionings is another matter.
When interviews explored the role of local actors and
communities in addressing and managing insecurities, infor-
mants showed similar complex and self-reflective opinions.
Informants clearly indicated that in many situations they felt
that capabilities existed for implementing certain responses
or strategy on their own (e.g. night patrols), in other situ-
ations they recognized their limitations (e.g. well-drilling).
When it came to discussions of who were the primary ac-
tors for achieving security functionings, informants identified
a mixed system, where the local communities, the police,
NGOs, and government actors all held some responsibility
to contribute. Informants stressed the need for local people
to be involved in the process of addressing insecurities, cit-
ing planning errors and misunderstandings that could have
been avoided with the help of local knowledge. These types
of responses suggest that informants felt that there is not
only a need for community-level actors to be involved in
addressing insecurities, but that local actors possessed key
knowledge and agency that was often needed to ensure the
successful resolution of insecurities. This indicates a mixed
level of capabilities in which some human security func-
tionings were considered achievable utilizing local capacity
alone, but others required non-local support.
In terms of identifying clear demonstrations of the appli-
cation of local agency as security actors, the results were
less definitive. The cases of YCWL and Eric’s group clearly
highlight that not all local actors have the same level of
capabilities in terms of security. While YCWL represents an
example of a successful strategy applied by a local actor,
Eric’s efforts failed in achieving security functionings. Why
did one case succeed and the other fail? Consider the
difference in terms of actor characteristics, the responses
advocated, and audience receptivity.
YCWL’s efforts since its foundation have effectively carved
out a position as legitimate and respected speakers for se-
curity. The strategies that they have employed have focused
on mustering community support and official recognition as a
form of legitimacy, and leverage this with international fund-
ing agencies. This was a slow but effective process to am-
plify their social and political capital, gaining recognition as
speakers of security regarding community and local level
needs. Leveraging this legitimacy, YCWL was able to access
the Japanese government’s grassroots grant program with a
securitizing move around a referent that fell across shared
values. Moreover, the fact that the responses advocated by
YCWL were tuned to human security needs well recognized
by their international audiences was undoubtedly a major fac-
tor in their success. The audience-compatible security claims
of YCWL in combination with the time spent earning credibility
with local community members, national, and international ac-
tors undoubtedly helped YCWL secure the resources needed
to achieve their desired security functionings.
The strategies applied by Eric’s group were focused on
using security rhetoric to accomplish their goals and shape
public opinion. This strategy was very effective at mustering
local support and is essentially a type of bottom-up secu-
ritization strategy. Targeting women as an initial audience
for security claims, and then leveraging that with local men
resulted in special handling at the local level in the form
of donated land. Unfortunately, this strategy hit a ceiling
when it came to international actors. The reasons for this
appear to be two-fold: firstly, the group’s lack of legitimacy in
that field created a barrier between them and funders; and
secondly, the funders - while open to hearing security claims
- were not entirely in agreement with the proposed resolution
to the security problem. They did not accept the security
objectives advocated by Eric as a securitizing agent, instead,
the funders advocated for an alternative solution to the one
advocated by Eric’s group. The free-trade business solution
proposed by the funders did not match the values of the
community. One can speculate as to whether something like
NGO accreditation would have made a difference, but it is
clear that the audience failed to resonate with Eric’s security
claims. Not only was the community unable to address the
source of insecurity in their community, but Eric suffered a
loss of social capital. Failure to securitize in this situation
came at a significant social cost to the securitizing agent.
Even though Eric’s claims were relatively non-
controversial— bridging themes of education and sexual
violence—they failed to resonate strongly with the audience.
Given Liberia’s post-war, less developed country context it
is unlikely that the claims were rejected based on the nature
of the threat alone. The key difference between YCWL and
Eric’s group was in the form of social capital and power
they had at their disposal. While the aims of both actors
were similar— situated around issues of gender, crime, vio-
lence, and education—YCWL was more successful in their
strategy. In terms of Balzacq’s (2005) criteria [12], audi-
ence receptivity to Eric’s claims was likely weakened by the
lack of social capital, thereby shifting the power relations
to favour a response alternative to that of the securitizing
agent. The failure to achieve these security functionings at
a comparable level indicates an inequality or deficiency in
regards to security capabilities. From the cases here, it is
apparent that local actors may not be able to assume the
same expectation of agency and thereby the same level
of capabilities when it comes to achieving human security
functionings. Differential capacity may drive actors to adopt
more conventional strategies, as YCWL did, or alternatively,
to employ more strategic methods, such as the type of
bottom-up micro-securitizations we saw from Eric’s group.
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6. Conclusion
This research has shown that sufficiently empowered local
actors can be effective agents for improving human security
conditions in their communities. Local actors are clearly
able to put voice to security claims and functionings, how-
ever, the ability of local actors to achieve human security
functionings that are beyond their normal means are depen-
dent on the ability of to augment their resources through
external sources. This requires legitimacy as a speaker of
security, and cultivating legitimacy was a key part of the
strategies employed in both the cases presented. Unfortu-
nately, as Eric’s case illustrates, not all local actors have the
social or political capital required to generate legitimacy at
higher levels, and thus they may lack capabilities to pursue
valued security functionings. Moreover, when bottom-up
securitization strategies are applied by local actors, their ef-
fectiveness appears to be dependent on the value placed on
socio-political factors by audiences, which fell outside of the
objective of this research. Understanding how bottom-up
securitization strategies work as a means of enhancing ca-
pabilities requires a deeper investigation of actor/audience
relations and what types of factors influence the receptiv-
ity of audiences; however, it is clear that securitization is
a strategy that can be applied by local actors to leverage
agency. As such, this research suggests two considerations
to human security minded actors both in Liberia and abroad:
firstly, local actors should evaluate how their legitimacy as
speakers of security is interpreted by funding audiences;
secondly, funding audiences should consider the ways in
which their criteria for legitimate claims may actually worsen
local security conditions. Cases such as this highlight the
challenges for local actors to achieve their security. More
importantly, they illustrate how the capabilities for local ac-
tors to achieve security functionings is heavily contingent on
the expansion of opportunities for community-level actors
to participate in security-making processes.
Recommendations for further research include a
fuller exploration of the theoretical basis for bottom-up
securitization, a meta-analysis of the cases examining
the effectiveness of local actors as securitizing actors,
as well as an empirical study of how audiences per-
ceive bottom-up securitizing acts in order to confirm
whether audiences perceive local actors as securitiz-
ing agents, or at least speakers for security. The ques-
tion as to which kinds of social and political capital
generate the legitimacy in a bottom-up securitizing act
is of key interest to this research. Understanding how
the audiences of bottom-up security claims interpret
legitimacy of both claimants and responses is a key
question for future research. If such questions can be
answered, both local and non-local actors can poten-
tially improve their ability to ensure the achievement
of the most critical and locally valued human security
functionings.
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